Mona designs the packages and chooses the brand names for goods produced by her firm. mona is involved in which part of the marketing mix

Answer the following questions using the banker’s algorithm: a. illustrate that the system is in a safe state by demonstrating an order in which the processes may complete. b. if a request from process p1 arrives for (1, 1, 0, 0), can the request be granted immediately? c. if a request from process p

Apractitioner is engaged to prepare a client's federal income tax return for 2017 and 2018. the practitioner files the 2017 return on the client's behalf and provided copies of the 2017 return and all related documents to the client. after the 2018 return is prepared, the client disputes the fees for the 2018 tax engagement, terminates the relationship, and requests all tax returns and related records. the client has not yet paid for preparation of the 2018 return. under irs circular 230, which records must the practitioner return to the client? a.) notes the practitioner took when meeting with the client about the 2017 and 2018 tax returns. b.) the engagement letter executed by the client for preparation of the 2018 federal income tax return. c.) an appraisal the practitioner prepared in connection with the 2017 federal income tax return. d.) schedules the practitioner prepared, which the client needs to file in its 2018 federal income tax return.

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i.e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i.e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect