If you place an order to buy or sell a share of a mutual fund during the trading day the order will be executed at a. the nav calculated at the market close at 4: 00 pm new york time. b. the real time nav. c. the nav delayed 15 minutes. d. the nav calculated at the open of the next day's trading.

Who is not spending wisely? erika goes shopping and saves her receipts. she totals how much she spent and writes it down. mia needs to buy a new pair of shoes because she joined the soccer team. she looks at newspaper ads to find the best price. lauren has been thinking about getting a puppy for a long time. she walks by the pet store at the mall and decides to get a puppy. erin makes a purchase online using a credit card. she knows that she can pay the entire bill when it arrives.

Stosch company's balance sheet reported assets of $112,000, liabilities of $29,000 and common stock of $26,000 as of december 31, year 1. if retained earnings on the balance sheet as of december 31, year 2, amount to $74,000 and stosch paid a $28,000 dividend during year 2, then the amount of net income for year 2 was which of the following? a)$23,000 b) $35,000 c) $12,000 d)$42,000

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?