When individual fishing boats harvest more fish each year in order to maximize profits while, as a result, threatening the fish population with extinction, it is called:
a public goods dilemma.
the tragedy of the commons.
relative deprivation.
sustainable consumption.
competition.

Pennewell publishing inc. (pp) is a zero growth company. it currently has zero debt and its earnings before interest and taxes (ebit) are $80,000. pp's current cost of equity is 10%, and its tax rate is 40%. the firm has 10,000 shares of common stock outstanding selling at a price per share of $48.00. refer to the data for pennewell publishing inc. (pp). pp is considering changing its capital structure to one with 30% debt and 70% equity, based on market values. the debt would have an interest rate of 8%. the new funds would be used to repurchase stock. it is estimated that the increase in risk resulting from the added leverage would cause the required rate of return on equity to rise to 12%. if this plan were carried out, what would be pp's new value of operations? a. $484,359 b. $521,173 c. $584,653 d. $560,748 e. $487,805

The basic difference between macroeconomics and microeconomics is that: a. microeconomics looks at the forest (aggregate markets) while macroeconomics looks at the trees (individual markets). b. macroeconomics is concerned with groups of individuals while microeconomics is concerned with single countries. c. microeconomics is concerned with the trees (individual markets) while macroeconomics is concerned with the forest (aggregate markets). d. macroeconomics is concerned with generalization while microeconomics is concerned with specialization.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?