Match the vocabulary word with its definition. 1 . to intrude 1 cash crop 2 . agricultural products grown to be sold collective 3 . the ability to nourish the population encroach 4 . moving herds cyclically from one place to another for the sake of pasture food security 5 . referring to the meeting of today's needs without encroaching on what's needed in the future organic farming 6 . a government-controlled farm pastoral nomadism 7 . the growing of crops to provide for the needs of one's family shifting agriculture 8 . moving to a new area when the old area's nutrients are used up subsistence farming 9 . referring to fragile relationships sustainable 10 . the growing of crops without chemicals tenuous

There is a small, family-owned store that sells food and household goods in a small town. the owners have good relations with the community, especially with local farmers who supply much of the food. the farmers aren't organized into a cooperative or union, and the store deals with each individually. suppose the store wanted to buy some farms to control the supply of certain vegetables. how would you classify this strategic move? select one: a. horizontal integration b. forward integration c. backward integration d. concentric integration

In william rathje's garbology project that focused on household waste, front door interviews found 15 percent of respondents saying that they consumed beer. the trash discard from the same area showed what percentage of household's consuming beer

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?