Distribution systems . a.)allocate endless goods and servicesb.)cannot satisfy everyone's wantsc.)only apply to services

Arriving and delivering a load of company executives for a business meeting at a destination far from home base requiring an overnight stay, a company’s pilot requested approval from the company finance office to pay to either have the company’s jet brought into the fbo's hangar overnight to protect it from a forecast snowfall or to have it de-iced by the fbo the following morning well-before scheduled departure. the company was under considerable financial pressure at the time, and the pilot’s requests were denied because of the cost. so, early the following morning, the pilot was up on the wing of the jet sweeping off an accumulation of snow and ice with a borrowed push broom in preparation for the scheduled departure with the executives, but slipped and fell to the ground, suffering a broken neck. the business was organized as a limited partnership, owned by 3 limited partners and one general partner. as a cost-saving measure, the company had dropped its workers’ compensation insurance before the accident. analyze the potential liability for the pilot’s injuries of each of the following, showing your reasoning clearly: the company the general partner the limited partners analyze how the outcome would have been different, if the business had been organized as a corporation and observed all of the formalities to legitimize its corporate status. analyze how the outcome would have been different, if the pilot had been covered by workers’ compensation insurance.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Hannah is concerned about the increase in the cases of obesity in her state. she has convinced her company to create advertisements to generate awareness about obesity. which kind of advertising will the company use to achieve this?