Circuittown commenced a gift card program in january 2018 and sold $15,350 of gift cards in january, $17,950 in february, and $20,950 in march of 2018 before discontinuing further gift card sales. during 2018, gift card redemptions were $8,700 for the january gift cards sold, $4,650 for the february cards, and $6,300 for the march cards. circuittown considers gift cards to be "broken" (not redeemable) 10 months after sale. required: 1. how much revenue will circuittown recognize with respect to january gift card sales during 2018? 2. prepare journal entries to record the sale of january gift cards, redemption of gift cards (ignore sales tax), and breakage (expiration) of gift cards. 3. how much revenue will circuittown recognize with respect to march gift card sales during 2018? 4. what liability for deferred revenue associated with gift card sales would circuittown show as of december 31, 2018?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?