Santiago delgado owns a copier store. he leases two copy machines for which he pays $20 each per day. he cannot increase the number of machines he leases without giving the office machine company six weeks' notice. he can hire as many workers as he wants, at a cost of $40 per day per worker. these are the only two inputs he uses to produce copies. fill in the remaining columns in the table below.

The gomez company, a merchandising firm, has budgeted its activity for december according to the following information: • sales at $500,000, all for cash. • merchandise inventory on november 30 was $250,000. • the cash balance at december 1 was $20,000. • selling and administrative expenses are budgeted at $50,000 for december and are paid for in cash. • budgeted depreciation for december is $30,000. • the planned merchandise inventory on december 31 is $260,000. • the cost of goods sold represents 75% of the selling price. • all purchases are paid for in cash. the budgeted cash disbursements for december are:

Adisadvantage of corporations is that shareholders have to pay on profits.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?