Consider a variation of the television station broadcast game of exercise 4 in chapter 7. suppose the stations interact sequentially. first, mbc chooses between 6: 00 and 7: 00. then, after observing mbc’s choice, rbc decides between 6: 00 and 7: 00. finally, after observing the behavior of both mbc and rbc, cbc chooses either 6: 00 or 7: 00. payoffs are as given before. draw the extensive form of this sequential game and compute the subgame perfect equilibrium. is the outcome different from that in the simultaneous-play game? explain.

Brian has just finished college. he wants to set up a small business to make and sell fireworks. he registers his company and acquires a license from the government. he finds that most of his competitors are selling fireworks at an extremely low price. he would like to make more money, so he decides to innovate and develop better fireworks. he sells his fireworks at a higher price, and they are a huge hit with the customers. after a few years, he earns enough profit to set up a bigger fireworks factory that complies with the government’s health and safety regulations. he even starts exporting fireworks overseas. which type of economy does this scenario describe?