Which of the following statements is correct? assume that the project being considered has normal cash flows, with one outflow followed by a series of inflows. a. one drawback of the regular payback for evaluating projects is that this method does not properly account for the time value of money. b. if a project's payback is positive, then the project should be rejected because it must have a negative npv. c. the regular payback ignores cash flows beyond the payback period, but the discounted payback method overcomes this problem. d. if a company uses the same payback requirement to evaluate all projects, say it requires a payback of 4 years or less, then the company will tend to reject projects with relatively short lives and accept long-lived projects, and this will cause its risk to increase over time. e. the longer a project's payback period, the more desirable the project is normally considered to be by this criterion.

Acountry made education free in mandatory up to age 15. it is established 100 new schools to educate kids across the country. as a result, citizens acquired the _ required to work. the school's generated _ for teachers and other staff. in 20 years, to countryside rapid _ and its gdp.

Right medical introduced a new implant that carries a five-year warranty against manufacturer’s defects. based on industry experience with similar product introductions, warranty costs are expected to approximate 2% of sales. sales were $8 million and actual warranty expenditures were $42,750 for the first year of selling the product. what amount (if any) should right report as a liability at the end of the year?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?