Hooper inc. offers a discount on an extended warranty on its eyephone when the warranty is purchased at the time the eyephone is purchased. the warranty normally has a price of $300, but hooper offers it for $240 when purchased along with an eyephone. hooper anticipates a 75% chance that a customer will purchase the extended warranty along with the eyephone. assume hooper sells 1,000 eyephones with the extended warranty discount offer. what is the total stand-alone selling price that hooper would use for the extended warranty discount option for purposes of allocating revenue among the performance obligations in those 1,000 eyephone contracts?
a. $240,000
b. $60,000
c. $45,000
d. $0

Ronald works for a small biotech firm. when the firm presents the results of its clinical trials to the fda, ronald realizes that the results are not accurate. he reports this to the fda. ronald is a(n)

In each of the following cases, find the unknown variable. ignore taxes. (do not round intermediate calculations and round your answers to the nearest whole number, e.g., 32.) accounting unit price unit variable cost fixed costs depreciation break-even 20,500 $ 44 $ 24 $ 275,000 $ 133,500 44 4,400,000 940,000 8,000 75 320,000 80,000

Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. as in class, the two firms are located at two ends of a line one mile apart. consumers are evenly distributed along the line. the firms have identical marginal cost, $60. firm b produces a product with value $110 to consumers.firm a (located at 0 on the unit line) produces a higher quality product with value $120 to consumers. the cost of travel are directly related to the distance a consumer travels to purchase a good. if a consumerhas to travel a mile to purchase a good, the incur a cost of $20. if they have to travel x fraction of a mile, they incur a cost of $20x. (a) write down the expressions for how much a consumer at location d would value the products sold by firms a and b, if they set prices p_{a} and p_{b} ? (b) based on your expressions in (a), how much will be demanded from each firm if prices p_{a} and p_{b} are set? (c) what are the nash equilibrium prices?