Approximately what percentage of those in agriscience actually work directly on farms?

90%

52%

25%

17%

Your team has identified the risks on the project and determined their risk score. the team is in the midst of determining what strategies to put in place should the risks occur. after some discussion, the team members have determined that the risk of losing their network administrator is a risk they'll just deal with if and when it occurs. although they think it's a possibility and the impact would be significant, they've decided to simply deal with it after the fact. which of the following is true regarding this question? a. this is a positive response strategy.b. this is a negative response strategy.c. this is a response strategy for either positive or negative risk known as contingency planning.d. this is a response strategy for either positive or negative risks known as passive acceptance.

Now ray has had the tires for two months and he notices that the tread has started to pull away from the tire. he has already contacted the place who sold the tires and calmly and accurately explained the problem. they didn’t him because they no longer carry that tire. so he talked with the manager and he still did not get the tire replaced. his consumer rights are being violated. pretend you are ray and write a letter to the company’s headquarters. here are some points to keep in mind when writing the letter: include your name, address, and account number, if appropriate. describe your purchase (name of product, serial numbers, date and location of purchase). state the problem and give the history of how you tried to resolve the problem. ask for a specific action. include how you can be reached.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?