Astate agency is considering two mutually exclusive alternatives for upgrading the skills of its technical staff.

alternative 1 involves purchasing software that will reduce the time required to collect background information on each client. the total cost for the purchase, installation, and training associated with the new software is $840,900. the present worth of the benefits from increased efficiency is expected to be $1,020,000
alternative 2 involves multimedia training to improve the performance of the staff technicians. the total cost to develop, install, and train the technicians will be $1,780,000. the present worth of the benefits from increased performance due to training is expected to be $1,990,000. use a b/c analysis to determine which alternative, if any, the agency should undertake.

After successfully completing your corporate finance class, you feel the next challenge ahead is to serve on the board of directors of schenkel enterprises. unfortunately, you will be the only person voting for you. the company has 375,000 shares outstanding, and the stock currently sells for $40, if there are four seats in the current election, how much will it cost you to buy a seat?

The face of a company is often that of the lowest paid employees who meet the customers. select one: true false

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?