Paul company completed the salary and wage payroll for the month of march. the payroll provided the following details: salaries and wages earned by employees $ 212,000 employee income taxes withheld 42,400 employee government insurance premiums withheld 4,000 fica payroll taxes* 16,900 *assessed on both employer and employee (i. e., $16,900 each). required: 1. prepare the journal entry to record the payroll for march, including employee deductions. assume employees have been paid, but that paul has yet to transfer any withholdings to the government. 2. prepare the journal entry to record the employer's payroll taxes, which have not yet been paid to the government. 3. provide a combined journal entry to show the payment of all amounts owed to governmental agencies. (for all requirements, if no entry is required for a transaction/event, select "no journal entry required" in the first account field.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?