Consider the hotelling model of the competition between two firms discussed in class. select all that apply.
a. if both firms are localized in position 1/2 (i. e., center of the line), neither firm has incentives to deviate and move to a different position.
b. in the nash equilibrium in pure strategies firms will localize together anywhere along the line.
c. if firm localize at the same point along the line, they will each sell to 50% of the consumers.
d. if firm 1 is located at position 1/2 (i. e., center of the line) and firm 2 is located somewhere else, then both firms have incentives to deviate and change their position along the line.

The corrects answers are: "a. If both firms are localized in position 1/2 (i.e., center of the line), neither firm has incentives to deviate and move to a different position.", "c. If Firm localize at the same point along the line, they will each sell to 50% of the consumers." and "d. If Firm 1 is located at position 1/2 (i.e., center of the line) and firm 2 is located somewhere else, then both firms have incentives to deviate and change their position along the line.".

Explanation: According to the Hotelling model of the competition between two firms:

a. If both firms are localized in position 1/2 (i.e., center of the line), neither firm has incentives to deviate and move to a different position. - If this were the case, it would be indifferent for customers to go to either.

c. If Firm localize at the same point along the line, they will each sell to 50% of the consumers. - This happens because each consumer will go to the nearest one.

d. If Firm 1 is located at position 1/2 (i.e., center of the line) and firm 2 is located somewhere else, then both firms have incentives to deviate and change their position along the line. - This happens because the strategy chosen is not suitable for either company.

answer; /// i believe the correct answer is (market share); good luck

answer; risk transference;