The following events pertain to Super Cleaning Company 1. Acquired $16,300 cash from the issue of common stock.2. Provided $14,300 of services on account3. Provided services for $5,300 cash.4. Received $3,700 cash in advance for services to be performed in the future.5. Collected $10,300 cash from the account receivable created in Event 2.6. Paid $6,300 for cash expenses.7. Performed $1.850 of the services agreed to in Event 4.8. Incurred $2,800 of expenses on account.9. Paid $1.750 cash in advance for one-year contract to rent office space. 10. Paid $2.450 cash on the account payable created in Event 811. Paid a $2,800 cash dividend to the stockholders. 2. Recognized rent expense for nine months use of office space acquired in Event 9

Which of the following is a competitive benefit experienced by the first mover firm in an industry? a. the first mover will be able to achieve a less steep learning curve. b. the first mover will be able to reduce the switching costs. c. the first mover will not have to patent its products or technology. d. the first mover will be able to reduce costs through economies of scale.

Which of the following statements about nonverbal communication is most accurate? a. the meanings of some gestures can vary among cultures b. the way an e-mail, letter, memo, or report looks can have either a positive or a negative effect on a receiver c. the manner in which we structure and use time can reveal our personalities and attitudes d. all statements are accurate

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?