Durable ceramics, inc., provides inexpensive ceramic tile to builders of institutional buildings such as schools, prisons, and public administration buildings. it has always competed on a cost leadership basis. most of its products are purchased by a few commercial construction firms, so it is fairly dependent on these construction firms for selling its product. durable ceramics' next most-efficient competitor, cost-less ceramics, inc., earns average returns, whereas durable earns above-average returns. the commercial construction firms are putting pressure on durable to reduce its prices. if durable reduces its prices below those of cost-less's prices, it is likely that:a. both durable and cost-less will devise additional ways to become more efficient in their productionprocesses. b. durable will be unable to absorb the lower cost, and will go out of business. c. both cost-less and durable will go out of business, leaving the customers with fewer alternative sources oflow-cost tile. d. cost-less will go out of business, and durable will gain higher power over its customers.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?