If person A and B are well informed and intelligent player, A have available choices :
1 going to church
2 going to hotel
3 coming to class
And player B also have three available choices :
1 going to library
2 going to hotel
3 coming to class
Q1, Develop a pay off matrix of a game between player A and B with TV he available choices against their dummies on the assumption that the expectation of graduation is reviewed by the two players A and B
2, is there a dominant equilibrium?
3 if yes will you call A a Nash equilibrium
. Please I need answers urgently

The a/p clerk of a company writes the checks for vendors, and the controller signs the checks. the a/p clerk hasdevised a plan to give herself a raise. she creates a new vendor for her friend's business and creates two purchaseorders for random car detailing services for $75 and $70. she writes the checks to pay these new vendors knowing thecontroller will only pay close attention to checks over $100. she delivers the checks to her friend to deposit in his bankaccount, and then he writes her a personal check for the full amount of $145.ceventually, what will be the effect of her actions? what can the company do to prevent this type of behavior? due mondav