A company has a selling price of $1,800 each for its printers. Each printer has a 2 year warranty that covers replacement of defective parts. It is estimated that 2% of all printers sold will be returned under the warranty at an average cost of $150 each. During November, the company sold 30,000 printers, and 400 printers were serviced under the warranty. What is the company's warranty expense for the month of November

You are thinking of making your mansion more energy efficient by replacing some of the light bulbs with compact fluorescent bulbs, and insulating part or all of your exterior walls. each compact fluorescent light bulb costs $4 and saves you an average of $2 per year in energy costs, and each square foot of wall insulation costs $1 and saves you an average of $0.20 per year in energy costs.† your mansion has 150 light fittings and 3000 sq ft of uninsulated exterior wall. to impress your friends, you would like to spend as much as possible, but save no more than $750 per year in energy costs (you are proud of your large utility bills). how many compact fluorescent light bulbs and how many square feet of insulation should you purchase? how much will you save in energy costs per year? (if an answer does not exist, enter dne.)

Upon completion of the northwest-corner rule, which source-destination cell is guaranteed to be occupied? a. top-leftb. the cell with the lowest shipping costc. bottom-leftd. top-righte. bottom-right

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?