A candidate approached a public relations firm to guide his campaign for a run at the governor’s mansion. Before the firm committed and formulated a campaign strategy, it decided to gather a group of people and ask them questions about the candidate to learn what the public thought about the candidate. Which step of the public relations process is the firm currently in, and why?

Problem 2-18 job-order costing for a service company [lo2-1, lo2-2, lo2-3]speedy auto repairs uses a job-order costing system. the company's direct materials consist of replacement parts installed in customer vehicles, and its direct labor consists of the mechanics' hourly wages. speedy's overhead costs include various items, such as the shop manager's salary, depreciation of equipment, utilities, insurance, and magazine subscriptions and refreshments for the waiting room. the company applies all of its overhead costs to jobs based on direct labor-hours. at the beginning of the year, it made the following estimates: direct labor-hours required to support estimated output 10,000fixed overhead cost $ 90,000variable overhead cost per direct labor-hour $ 1.00 required: 1. compute the predetermined overhead rate.2. during the year, mr. wilkes brought in his vehicle to replace his brakes, spark plugs, and tires. the following information was available with respect to his job: direct materials $ 600direct labor cost $ 180direct labor-hours used 2 compute mr. wilkes' total job cost. 3. if speedy establishes its selling prices using a markup percentage of 30% of its total job cost, then how much would it have charged mr. wilkes?

In which of the following games is it clearly the case that the cooperative outcome of the game is good for the two players and bad for society? a. two oil companies own adjacent oil fields over a common pool of oil, and each company decides whether to drill one well or two wells.b. two airlines dominate air travel between city a and city b, and each airline decides whether to charge a "high" airfare or a "low" airfare on flights between those two cities.c. two superpowers decide whether to build new weapons or to disarm.d. in all of the above cases, the cooperative outcome of the game is good for the two players and bad for society

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?