A borrower takes out a 15-year loan for 65,000, with level end-of-month payments. The annual nominal interest rate of the loan is 8%, convertible monthly. Immediately after the 12th payment is made, the remaining loan balance is reamortized. The maturity date of the loan remains unchanged, but the annual nominal interest rate of the loan is changed to 6%, convertible monthly. Calculate the new end-of-month payment.

Bonds often pay a coupon twice a year. for the valuation of bonds that make semiannual payments, the number of periods doubles, whereas the amount of cash flow decreases by half. using the values of cash flows and number of periods, the valuation model is adjusted accordingly. assume that a $1,000,000 par value, semiannual coupon us treasury note with three years to maturity has a coupon rate of 3%. the yield to maturity (ytm) of the bond is 7.70%. using this information and ignoring the other costs involved, calculate the value of the treasury note:

The following information is from the 2019 records of albert book shop: accounts receivable, december 31, 2019 $ 42 comma 000 (debit) allowance for bad debts, december 31, 2019 prior to adjustment 2 comma 000 (debit) net credit sales for 2019 179 comma 000 accounts written off as uncollectible during 2017 15 comma 000 cash sales during 2019 28 comma 500 bad debts expense is estimated by the method. management estimates that $ 5 comma 300 of accounts receivable will be uncollectible. calculate the amount of bad debts expense for 2019.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?