Frank Wesley, project manager for the LOGON project, is concerned about the development time for the robotic transporter. Although the subcontractor, Creative Robotics, has promised a delivery time of 6 weeks, Frank knows that the actual delivery time will be a function of the number of other projects Creative Robotics is working on. As an incentive to speed up delivery of the transporter, Frank has three options: S1: Do nothing S2: Promise Creative Robotics a future contract with Iron Butterfly S3: Threaten to never contract with Creative Robotics again. He estimates the impact of these actions on delivery time would be as follows: Payoffs: Strategy Creative Robotics Workload Low Average Busy S1 4 6 8 S2 3 4 7 S3 3 6 6 What strategy should Frank adopt based upon uncertainty criteria

Which of the following goals is most effective? i will purchase a house by age twenty-five. i will purchase a three-bedroom house located near cherry park by my twenty-fifth birthday. in order to reach this goal, i will graduate from college and secure a job as a software developer.

Identify the three components of a family's culture and provide one example from your own experience

Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. as in class, the two firms are located at two ends of a line one mile apart. consumers are evenly distributed along the line. the firms have identical marginal cost, $60. firm b produces a product with value $110 to consumers.firm a (located at 0 on the unit line) produces a higher quality product with value $120 to consumers. the cost of travel are directly related to the distance a consumer travels to purchase a good. if a consumerhas to travel a mile to purchase a good, the incur a cost of $20. if they have to travel x fraction of a mile, they incur a cost of $20x. (a) write down the expressions for how much a consumer at location d would value the products sold by firms a and b, if they set prices p_{a} and p_{b} ? (b) based on your expressions in (a), how much will be demanded from each firm if prices p_{a} and p_{b} are set? (c) what are the nash equilibrium prices?