Saskatewan Can Company manufactures recyclable soft-drink cans. A unit of production is a case of 12 dozen cans. The following standards have been set by the production-engineering staff and the controller. Direct Labor: Direct Material: Quantity, 0.19 hour Quantity, 6 kilograms Rate, $9.50 per hour Price, $0.48 per kilogram Actual material purchases amounted to 229,600 kilograms at $0.550 per kilogram. Actual costs incurred in the production of 28,000 units were as follows: Direct labor: $59,094 for 5,880 hours Direct material: $100,870 for 183,400 kilograms Required: 1. Use the variance formulas to compute the direct-material price and quantity variances, the direct-material purchase price variance, and the direct-labor rate and efficiency variances. Indicate whether each variance is favorable or unfavorable. (Indicate the effect of each variance by selecting "Favorable" or "Unfavorable". Select "None" and enter "0" for no effect (i. e., zero variance).)

Mr. beautiful, an organization that sells weight training sets, has an ordering cost of $40 for the bb-1 set. (bb-1 stands for body beautiful number 1.) the carrying cost for bb-1 is $5 per set per year. to meet demand, mr. beautiful orders large quantities of bb-1 seven times a year. the stockout cost for bb-1 is estimated to be $50 per set. over the past several years, mr. beautiful has observed the following demand during the lead time for bb-1: demand during lead time probability40 0.150 0.260 0.270 0.280 0.290 0.1total 1.0the reorder point for bb-1 is 60 sets. what level of safety stock should be maintained for bb-1?

The era of venture capitalists doling out large sums of money to startups is a. just beginning b. on the rise c. over d. fading

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?