On December 31, 2017, Houser Company granted some of its executives options to purchase 150,000 shares of the company's $50 par common stock at an option price of $60 per share. The Black-Scholes option pricing model determines total compensation expense to be $3,000,000. The options become exercisable on January 1, 2018, and represent compensation for executives' past and future services over a three-year period beginning January 1, 2018. What is the impact on Houser's total stockholders' equity for the year ended December 31, 2017, as a result of this transaction under the fair value method

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?