Giselle, the executive of an American transportation firm, is negotiating a deal with a Japanese corporation. During the meeting, Giselle notices that her negotiation partners frequently break into side conversations using their native language. What is the most likely reason for these side conversations?

Ancho corp. is an automobile company whose core competency lies in manufacturing petrol- and diesel- based cars. the company realizes that more of its potential customers are switching to electric cars. the r& d department of the company acquires competencies in developing electric cars and launches its first hybrid car, which uses both gas and electricity. in this scenario, ancho is primarilya. leveraging new core competencies to improve current market position. b. redeploying existing core competencies to compete in future markets. c. unlearning existing core competencies to create and compete in markets of the future. d. building new core competencies to protect and extend current market position

You estimate that your cattle farm will generate $0.15 million of profits on sales of $3 million under normal economic conditions and that the degree of operating leverage is 2. (leave no cells blank - be certain to enter "0" wherever required. do not round intermediate calculations. enter your answers in millions.) a. what will profits be if sales turn out to be $1.5 million?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?