What is the main advantage of a command enconomy?

Suppose that jim plans to borrow money for an education at texas a& m university. jim will need to borrow $25,000 at the end of each year for the next five years (total=$125,000). jim wishes his parents could pay for his education but they can’t. at least, he qualifies for government loans with a reduced interest rate while he is in school. he has a special arrangement with aggiebank to lend him the money at a subsidized rate of 1% over five years without having to make a payment until the end of the fifth year. however, at the end of the fifth year, jim agrees to pay off the loan by borrowing from longhorn bank. longhorn bank will lend him the money he needs at an annual interest rate of 6%. jim agrees to pay back the longhorn bank with 20 annual payments and the payments will be uniform (equal annual payments including principal and interest). (i) calculate how much money jim has to borrow at the end of 5 years to pay off the loan with aggiebank. a. $121,336 b. $127,525 c. $125,000 d. $102,020 e. none of the above

Microsoft's stock price peaked at 6118% of its ipo price more than 13 years after the ipo suppose that $10,000 invested in microsoft at its ipo price had been worth $600,000 (6000% of the ipo price) after exactly 13 years. what interest rate, compounded annually, does this represent? (round your answer to two decimal places.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?