Jill would like to plan for her son's college education. She would like for her son, who was born today, to attend college for 5 years, beginning at age 18. Tuition is currently $13,000 per year and tuition inflation is 6%. Jill can earn an after-tax rate of return of 8%. How much must Jill save at the end of each year, if she wants to make the last payment at the beginning of her son's first year of college

To : of $25 up to 35 2 35 up to 45 5 45 up to 55 7 55 up to 65 20 65 up to 75 16 is$25 up to $35 ?

The farmer's market just paid an annual dividend of $5 on its stock. the growth rate in dividends is expected to be a constant 5 percent per year indefinitely. investors require a 13 percent return on the stock for the first 3 years, a 9 percent return for the next 3 years, a 7 percent return thereafter. what is the current price per share? select one: a. $212.40 b. $220.54 c. $223.09 d. $226.84 e. $227.50 previous pagenext page

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?