Gabriele Enterprises has bonds on the market making annual payments, with eight years to maturity, a par value of $1,000, and selling for $948. At this price, the bonds yield 5.1 percent. What must the coupon rate be on the bonds? (Do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answer as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.)

Cadbury has a chocolate factory in dunedin, new zealand. for easter, it makes two kinds of “easter eggs”: milk chocolate and dark chocolate. it cycles between producing milk and dark chocolate eggs. the table below provides data on these two products. demand (lbs per hour) milk: 500 dark: 200 switchover time (minutes) milk: 60 dark: 30 production rate per hour milk: 800 dark: 800 for example, it takes 30 minutes to switch production from milk to dark chocolate. demand for milk chocolate is higher (500lbs per hour versus 200 lbs per hour), but the line produces them at the same rate (when operating): 800 lbs per hour. a : suppose cadbury produces 2,334lbs milk chocolate and 1,652 lbs of dark chocolate in each cycle. what would be the maximum inventory (lbs) of milk chocolate? b : how many lbs of milk and dark chocolate should be produced with each cycle so as to satisfy demand while minimizing inventory?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

George retired from a local law firm and then volunteered to oversee a nonprofit's legal records. george is performing the duties of a: