The amount of money the policyholder pays per claim before the insurance company will pay on the claim is known as the:.

In 2015, lori assigned a paid-up whole life insurance policy to an irrevocable life insurance trust (ilit) for the benefit of her three children. the ilit contained a crummey provision for the benefit of each child. at the time of the transfer, the whole life insurance policy was valued at $200,000, and since lori had not made any other taxable gifts during her lifetime, she did not owe any gift tax. lori died in 2016, and the face value of the whole life insurance policy of $2,000,000 was paid to the ilit. regarding this transfer, how much is included in lori’s gross estate at her death?

Total marketing effort is a term used to describe the critical decision factors that affect demand: price, advertising, distribution, and product quality. define the variable x to represent total marketing effort. a typical model that is used to predict demand as a function of total marketing effort is based on the power function: d = axb suppose that a is a positive number. different model forms result from varying the constant b. sketch the graphs of this model for b = 0, b = 1, 0< b< 1, b< 0, and b> 1. (we encourage you to use excel to do this.) what does each model tell you about the relationship between demand and marketing effort? what assumptions are implied? are they reasonable? how would you go about selecting the appropriate model?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?