Bob, a coworker who is the same age as the Ann in the previous problem, begins to invest $2000 per year in the same mutual fund earning 12 percent. He only begins investing when Ann stops (i. e. at age 29). Bob is more disciplined, however, and invests the $2,000 every year until he retires at age 65. Calculate how much he will have in the account. Assume annual compounding.

David burdick is the ceo of acme bubblegum, a successful public company. as one of the cofounders of the company, burdick has enjoyed speaking and writing about the success of acme bubblegum for several years. typically, he speaks at conferences or directly to the press, but recently, he has been blogging about his firm anonymously. specifically, he defended a recent advertising campaign that was unpopular among consumers and pointedly attacked one of acme bubblegum’s competitors. burdick deeply enjoys his anonymous blogging and believes that none of his readers actually know that he works for acme bubblegum.should burdick be allowed to praise his company’s performance anonymously online? should he be allowed to attack his competitors without disclosing his relationship with the company? how would you feel if the ceo of a company at which you shopped was secretly writing criticisms of his or her competition? how would you feel if you knew a writer for your favorite blog was actually closely involved in a company that the blog discussed? 1. define the ethical issue? 2. who are the primary stakeholders? 3. what are the possible alternatives? 4. how could you evaluate the ethical implications of the alternative actions (use appropriate decision rules)? 5. what action would you recommend and why?

Sue now has $125. how much would she have after 8 years if she leaves it invested at 8.5% with annual compounding? a. $205.83b. $216.67c. $228.07d. $240.08e. $252.08

Many potential buyers value high-quality used cars at the full-information market price of € p1 and lemons at € p2. a limited number of potential sellers value high-quality cars at € v1 ≤ p1 and lemons at € v2 ≤ p2. everyone is risk neutral. the share of lemons among all the used cars that might be potentially sold is € θ . suppose that the buyers incur a transaction cost of $200 to purchase a car. this transaction cost is the value of their time to find a car. what is the equilibrium? is it possible that no cars are sold