What are other ways than bribery to gain a competitive edge in countries where bribes are both accepted and expected?

Maker-bot corporation has 10,000 shares of 10%, $90 par value, cumulative preferred stock outstanding since its inception. no dividends were declared in the first two years. if the company pays $400,000 of dividends in the third year, how much will common stockholders receive?

Shelby company produces three products: product x, product y, and product z. data concerning the three products follow (per unit): product x product y product z selling price $ 85 $ 65 $ 75 variable expenses: direct materials 25.50 19.50 5.25 labor and overhead 25.50 29.25 47.25 total variable expenses 51.00 48.75 52.50 contribution margin $ 34.00 $ 16.25 $ 22.50 contribution margin ratio 40 % 25 % 30 % demand for the company’s products is very strong, with far more orders each month than the company can produce with the available raw materials. the same material is used in each product. the material costs $8 per pound, with a maximum of 4,400 pounds available each month. required: a. compute contribution margin per pound of materials used. (round your intermediate calculations and final answers to 2 decimal places.) contribution margin per pound product x $ product y $ product z $ b. which orders would you advise the company to accept first, those for product x, for product y, or for product z? which orders second? third? product x product y product z

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?