Faz, Inc., manufactures and sells two products: Product X0 and Product W7. Data concerning the expected production of each product and the expected total direct labor-hours (DLHs) required to produce that output appear below: Expected Production Direct Labor-Hours Per Unit Total Direct Labor-Hours
Product X0 2,000 4 8,000
Product W7 440 3 1,320
Total direct labor-hours 9,320

The direct labor rate is $38.60 per DLH. The direct materials cost per unit is $163.50 for Product X0 and $145 for Product W7. The company is considering adopting an activity-based costing system with the following activity cost pools, activity measures, and expected activity:

Expected Activity
Activity Cost Pools Activity Measures Estimated Overhead Cost Product X0 Product W7 Total
Labor-related DLHs $276,078 8,000 1,320 9,320
Production orders orders 19,348 540 740 1,280
Order size MHs 241,614 4,040 4,140 8,180
$537,040

If the company allocates all of its overhead based on direct labor-hours using its traditional costing method, the overhead assigned to each unit of Product XO would be closest to:

What is the communication process? why isnt it possible to communicate without using all the elements in the communication process?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

In each of the cases below, assume division x has a product that can be sold either to outside customers or to division y of the same company for use in its production process. the managers of the divisions are evaluated based on their divisional profits. case a b division x: capacity in units 200,000 200,000 number of units being sold to outside customers 200,000 160,000 selling price per unit to outside customers $ 90 $ 75 variable costs per unit $ 70 $ 60 fixed costs per unit (based on capacity) $ 13 $ 8 division y: number of units needed for production 40,000 40,000 purchase price per unit now being paid to an outside supplier $ 86 $ 74 required: 1. refer to the data in case a above. assume in this case that $3 per unit in variable selling costs can be avoided on intracompany sales. a. what is the lowest acceptable transfer price from the perspective of the selling division? b. what is the highest acceptable transfer price from the perspective of the buying division? c. what is the range of acceptable transfer prices (if any) between the two divisions? if the managers are free to negotiate and make decisions on their own, will a transfer probably take place?