Do you believe the executive of a large company and the mayor of a large city need the same leadership characteristics?

You hear your supervisor tell another supervisor that a fire drill will take place later today when the fire alarm sounds that afternoon you should

About 20 years ago, sturdy light, inc., produced a sturdy, lightweight backpack in a market that was rapidly growing. sturdy light became a leader in this market. eventually, the backpack market reached the maturity stage and slowed down. however, by this time, sturdy light had developed a strong brand name and continued to steadily lead the market. which of the following describes this scenario? a. sturdy light was a star that developed into a cash cow. b. sturdy light was a question mark that developed into a star. c. sturdy light was a dog that developed into a question mark. d. sturdy light was a cash cow that developed into a star.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?