Business, 02.11.2020 20:10 kingcory717
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Read about Wanda’s complaint to the FDIC. What action did the regulator most likely take in this case?
The FDIC found out that a company misreported information to a credit scoring company about Wanda. Wanda contacted the company and asked them to fix the problem. The company refused to talk about it and referred her back to the credit company. The FDIC declares the company has violated the .
Answers: 2
Business, 22.06.2019 09:40
Henry crouch's law office has traditionally ordered ink refills 55 units at a time. the firm estimates that carrying cost is 35% of the $11 unit cost and that annual demand is about 240 units per year. the assumptions of the basic eoq model are thought to apply. for what value of ordering cost would its action be optimal? a) for what value of ordering cost would its action be optimal?
Answers: 2
Business, 22.06.2019 18:00
Martha entered into a contract with terry, an art dealer. according to the contract, terry was to supply 18 th century artifacts to martha for the play she was directing, and martha was ready to pay $50,000 for this. another director needed the same artifacts and was ready to pay $60,000. terry decided not to sell the artifacts to martha. in this case, the court may order terry to:
Answers: 2
Business, 23.06.2019 00:00
How much is a 2019 tesla? ? exact price trying to buy for my 6 year old sister
Answers: 2
Business, 23.06.2019 00:00
1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?
Answers: 3
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Read about Wanda’s complaint to the FDIC. What a...
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