The shirker who free rides the teammate's effort yields a $55 personal compensation

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Greentel, a telecom giant, has been using the service of orpheus inc. for training its employees. according to a deal signed by the two companies, orpheus inc. is not only responsible for training greentel's employees but also for providing comprehensive administrative services to the telecom giant. in this instance, greentel engages in

Denise is a hard worker, but she has always had differences with her boss, angela. angela has recently become more demanding and is often unwilling to provide clarification on project requirements. after too many long working days with little or no job satisfaction, denise walked into angela's office and submitted her resignation. denise knows that her résumé is strong and feels confident she will find another job. denise is now facing unemployment.a. seasonalb. cyclicalc. structurald. frictional