You are looking at two locations. Traveling to downtown from Location A involves 3 miles of backroads at 30 MPH. Traveling to downtown from Location B involves 1 mile of backroads at 30 MPH and 5 miles of highway at 60 MPH. Which location has the
shorter trip to downtown?
A or B?

Dyed-denim corporation is seeking to lower the costs of value creation and achieve a low-cost position. as a result, it plans to move its manufacturing plant from the u.s. to thailand, which based on company research, is the optimal location for production. this strategic move will most likely allow the company to realize

Acompany manufactures x units of product a and y units of product b, on two machines, i and ii. it has been determined that the company will realize a profit of $3 on each unit of product a and $4 on each unit of product b. to manufacture a unit of product a requires 7 min on machine i and 5 min on machine ii. to manufacture a unit of product b requires 8 min on mchine i and 5 min on machine ii. there are 175 min available on machine i and 125 min available on machine ii in each work shift. how many units of a product should be produced in each shift to maximize the company's profit p?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?