Who are engaged in indirect services

Consider the scenario below and let us know if you believe lauren smith's actions to be ethical. let us know why or why not. lauren smith is the controller for sports central, a chain of sporting goods stores. she has been asked to recommend a site for a new store. lauren has an uncle who owns a shopping plaza in the area of town where the new store is to be located, so she decides to contact her uncle about leasing space in his plaza. lauren also contacted several other shopping plazas and malls, but her uncle’s store turned out to be the most economical place to lease. therefore, lauren recommended locating the new store in her uncle’s shopping plaza. in making her recommendation to management, she did not disclose that her uncle owns the shopping plaza. if management decided to go with lauren's uncle's plaza, what additional information would be needed in the financial statements?

Kyle and alyssa paid $1,000 and $4,000 in qualifying expenses for their two daughters jane and jill, respectively, to attend the university of california. jane is a sophomore and jill is a freshman. kyle and alyssa's agi is $135,000 and they file a joint return. what is their allowable american opportunity tax credit after the credit phase-out based on agi is taken into account?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?