How does the consolidation process tend to disguise information needed to analyze the finan- cial operations of a diversified organization?

Afood worker has just rinsed a dish after cleaning it.what should he do next?

1. what is the lowest balance during this period? 2. lily just received her bank statement below. a. what does the bank think her ending balance is? b. how much more does the bank think lily has? c. what transactions are missing? 3. what is the danger of not balancing your bank account? lily’s bank statement deposits: 2/25 $35 2/26 $20 3/1 $256.32 checks: 2/24 ck #301 $25 2/26 #302 $150 debit card: 2/24 american eagle $75.48 2/25 chick fa la $4.67 2/27 mcdonalds $3.56 2/28 chevron $34.76 withdrawal: 2/27 $40 beginning balance $423.34 deposits $311.32 total debits $333.47 ending balance $401.19

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?