Talboe Co. issued 90,000 shares of $9 par common stock for $1,500,000. A year later Talboe acquired 12,000 shares of its own common stock at $12 per share. Three months later Talboe sold 5,000 of these shares at $20 per share. Talboe Co. uses the cost method to record treasury stock transactions. Select which is the correct journal entry when Talboe Co. sold the 5,000 shares of stock. a. Debit Cash $100,000; Credit Treasury Stock $60,000, Credit Paid in Capital Excess - Treasury Stock $40,000
b. Debit Cash $100,000; Credit Treasury Stock $100,000 Debit
c. Cash $100,000; Credit Treasury Stock $40,000, Credit Paid in Capital Excess - Treasury Stock $60,000
d. Debit Treasury Stock $60,000, Debit Paid in Capital Excess - Treasury Stock $40,000; Credit Cash $100,00

Kendra knight took part in a friendly game of touch football. she had played before and was familiar with football. michael jewett was on her team. in the course of play, michael bumped into kendra and knocked her to the ground. he stepped on her hand, causing injury to a little finger that later required its amputation. she sued michael for damages. he defended on the ground that she had assumed the risk. kendra claimed that assumption of risk could not be raised as a defense because the state legislature had adopted the standard of comparative negligence. what happens if contributory negligence applies? what happens if the defense of comparative negligence applies?

Which statement or statements are implied by equilibrium conditions of the loanable funds market? a firm borrowing in the loanable funds market invests those funds with a higher expected return than any firm that is not borrowing. investment projects which use borrowed funds are guaranteed to be profitable even after paying interest expenses. the quantity of savings is maximized, thus the quantity of investment is maximized. a loan is made at the minimum interest rate of all current borrowing.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?