In 2018, U. S. President Donald Trump proposed a 33% cut in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) budget for the upcoming fiscal year, which would have reduced USAID spending in 2019 to $16.8 billion. His total proposed 2019 budget for the U. S. federal government was $4.4 trillion. There are many ways one can use to develop a sense of scale to explain the magnitude of foreign aid spending. Which of the following would not be helpful? It would not help to compare the U. S. federal budget this year to previous years.
Compare foreign aid spending this year to previous years. think about the ratio of foreign aid to the total U. S.
Federal budget. think about the U. S.
Federal budget per person and foreign aid per person.

Russell's is considering purchasing $697,400 of equipment for a four-year project. the equipment falls in the five-year macrs class with annual percentages of .2, .32, .192, .1152, .1152, and .0576 for years 1 to 6, respectively. at the end of the project the equipment can be sold for an estimated $135,000. the required return is 13.2 percent and the tax rate is 23 percent. what is the amount of the aftertax salvage value of the equipment assuming no bonus depreciation is taken

The uptowner just paid an annual dividend of $4.12. the company has a policy of increasing the dividend by 2.5 percent annually. you would like to purchase shares of stock in this firm but realize that you will not have the funds to do so for another four years. if you require a rate of return of 16.7 percent, how much will you be willing to pay per share when you can afford to make this investment?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?