Why do you think many consumers now shop on the Internet? What types of products do you think they probably buy online?Write in detail or not.

On december 31, 2013, coronado company issues 173,000 stock-appreciation rights to its officers entitling them to receive cash for the difference between the market price of its stock and a pre-established price of $10. the fair value of the sars is estimated to be $5 per sar on december 31, 2014; $2 on december 31, 2015; $10 on december 31, 2016; and $8 on december 31, 2017. the service period is 4 years, and the exercise period is 7 years. prepare a schedule that shows the amount of compensation expense allocable to each year affected by the stock-appreciation rights plan.

Suppose life expectancy in years (l) is a function of two inputs, health expenditures (h) and nutrition expenditures (n) in hundreds of dollars per year. the production function is upper l equals ch superscript 0.40 baseline upper n superscript 0.60l=ch0.40n0.60. beginning with c = 1, a health input of $400400 per year (hequals=44) and a nutrition input of $400400 per year (nequals=44), show that the marginal product of health expenditures and the marginal product of nutrition expenditures are both decreasing. the marginal product of health expenditures when h goes from 44 to 55 is nothing, and the marginal product of health when h goes from 66 to 77 is nothing. (round your answers to three decimal places.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?