Presented below is information related to Novak Corp., which sells merchandise with terms 2/10, net 60. Novak Corp. records its sales and receivables net. July 1 Novak Corp. sold to Warren Harding Co. merchandise having a sales price of $18,000. 5 Accounts receivable of $12,300 (gross) are factored with Andrew Jackson Credit Corp. without recourse at a financing charge of 8%. Cash is received for the proceeds; collections are handled by the finance company. (These accounts were all past the discount period.) 9 Specific accounts receivable of $12,300 (gross) are pledged to Alf Landon Credit Corp. as security for a loan of $6,400 at a finance charge of 6% of the amount of the loan. The finance company will make the collections. (All the accounts receivable are past the discount period.) Dec. 29 Warren Harding Co. notifies Novak that it is bankrupt and will pay only 20% of its account. Give the entry to write off the uncollectible balance using the allowance method. (Note: First record the increase in the receivable on July 11 when the discount period passed.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?