Recently, the owner of Martha's Wares encountered severe legal problems and is trying to sell her business. The company built a building at a cost of $1,240,000 that is currently appraised at $1,440,000. The equipment originally cost $720,000 and is currently valued at $467,000. The inventory is valued on the balance sheet at $410,000 but has a market value of only one-half of that amount. The owner expects to collect 98 percent of the $225,200 in accounts receivable. The firm has $10,500 in cash and owes a total of $1,440,000. The legal problems are personal and unrelated to the actual business. What is the market value of this firm? a. $1,333,396
b. $672,000
c. $1,108,196
d. $903,196
e. $1,743,396

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?