an orange grove company has sensors in the the trees and on the machines that harvest the oranges. a camera mounted on the harvester takes a close-up picture of the orange every 5 minutes. live data is sent to the distributor who gets this data from 100 companies. does the distributor have big data?

)murphy was consuming 100 units of x and 50 units of y . the price of x rose from 2 to 3. the price of y remained at 4. (a) how much would murphy’s income have to rise so that he can still exactly afford 100 units of x and 50 units of y ? g

Assuming no direct factory overhead costs (i.e., inventory carry costs) and $3 million dollars in combined promotion and sales budget, the deft product manager wishes to achieve a product contribution margin of 35%. given their product currently is priced at $35.00, what would they need to limit the material and labor costs to?

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1