David works at Klambunk Motors, an automobile manufacturing company. Once a new automobile has been designed by the design team, David determines and finalizes all the activities required to manufacture and deliver the new automobiles to showrooms. In this scenario, David determines the needed to transform the company's inputs into outputs.

On january 1, vermont corporation had 40,000 shares of $10 par value common stock issued and outstanding. all 40,000 shares has been issued in a prior period at $20.00 per share. on february 1, vermont purchased 3,750 shares of treasury stock for $24 per share and later sold the treasury shares for $21 per share on march 1. the journal entry to record the purchase of the treasury shares on february 1 would include a credit to treasury stock for $90,000 debit to treasury stock for $90,000 credit to a gain account for $112,500 debit to a loss account for $112,500

Six years ago, an 80-kw diesel electric set cost $160,000. the cost index for this class of equipment six years ago was 187 and is now 194. the cost-capacity factor is 0.6. the plant engineering staff is considering a 120-kw unit of the same general design to power a small isolated plant. assume we want to add a precompressor, which (when isolated and estimated separately) currently costs $13291. determine the total cost of the 120-kw unit. (hint: skip $ and comma symbols)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?