Given below are comparative statements of financial position (balance sheets) and an income statement for Claret Corporation. Claret Corporation Balance Sheets Year 2 December 31 January 1 Cash $ 16,500 $ 16,500 Accounts receivable 47,970 39,500 Inventory 33,400 37,300 Equipment (net) 58,100 67,200 Total $ 155,970 $ 160,500 Accounts payable 26,900 29,500 Dividends payable 8,700 4,800 Long-term note payable 15,200 15,200 Capital stock, $5 par 73,700 73,700 Retained earnings 31,470 37,300 Total $ 155,970 $ 160,500 Claret Corporation Income Statement For the year ended Year 2 Sales $ 229,700 Cost of goods sold 137,630 Gross profit on sales $ 92,070 Operating expenses 75,958 Operating income $ 16,112 Interest expense and income taxes 9,550 Net income $ 6,562 All sales were made on account. Cash dividends declared during the year totaled $12,392. Claret Corporation's inventory turnover for Year 2 is:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?