The 20% off sale is a better deal than the $200 rebate or $150 coupon for the $1,500 dining set. the porters budgeted $1,250 for a new dining room set. explain why this is the best deal for them. are they under budget?

Kando company incurs a $9 per unit cost for product a, which it currently manufactures and sells for $13.50 per unit. instead of manufacturing and selling this product, the company can purchase product b for $5 per unit and sell it for $12 per unit. if it does so, unit sales would remain unchanged and $5 of the $9 per unit costs assigned to product a would be eliminated. 1. prepare incremental cost analysis. should the company continue to manufacture product a or purchase product b for resale? (round your answers to 2 decimal places.)

Johnson company uses the allowance method to account for uncollectible accounts receivable. bad debt expense is established as a percentage of credit sales. for 2018, net credit sales totaled $6,400,000, and the estimated bad debt percentage is 1.40%. the allowance for uncollectible accounts had a credit balance of $61,000 at the beginning of 2018 and $49,500, after adjusting entries, at the end of 2018.required: 1. what is bad debt expense for 2018 as a percent of net credit sales? 2. assume johnson makes no other adjustment of bad debt expense during 2018. determine the amount of accounts receivable written off during 2018.3. if the company uses the direct write-off method, what would bad debt expense be for 2018?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?