Norton, inc. purchased equipment in 2013 at a cost of $800,000. two years later it became apparent to norton, inc. that this equipment had suffered an impairment of value. in early 2015, the book value of the asset is $520,000 and it is estimated that the fair value is now only $320,000. the entry to record the impairment is

Paccar's current stock price is $75.10 and it is likely to pay a $3.29 dividend next year. since analysts estimate paccar will have a 14.2 percent growth rate, what is its required return? multiple choice 15.39 percent 17.94 percent 19.62 percent 18.58 percent

Aresearcher developing scanners to search for hidden weapons at airports has concluded that a new scanner isis significantly better than the current scanner. he made his decision based on a test using alpha equals 0.025 .α=0.025. would he have made the same decision at alpha equals 0.10 question mark α=0.10? how about alpha equals 0.01 question mark α=0.01? explain

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?