Other than mr. tambourine man, which is another bob dylan song that appears in coriglianoâs song cycle

Kiona co. set up a petty cash fund for payments of small amounts. the following transactions involving the petty cash fund occurred in may (the last month of the company's fiscal year). may 1 prepared a company check for $350 to establish the petty cash fund. 15 prepared a company check to replenish the fund for the following expenditures made since may 1. a. paid $109.20 for janitorial services. b. paid $89.15 for miscellaneous expenses. c. paid postage expenses of $60.90. d. paid $80.01 to the county gazette (the local newspaper) for an advertisement. e. counted $26.84 remaining in the petty cashbox. 16 prepared a company check for $200 to increase the fund to $550. 31 the petty cashier reports that $380.27 cash remains in the fund. a company check is drawn to replenish the fund for the following expenditures made since may 15. f. paid postage expenses of $59.10. g. reimbursed the office manager for business mileage, $47.05. h. paid $48.58 to deliver merchandise to a customer, terms fob destination. 31 the company decides that the may 16 increase in the fund was too large. it reduces the fund by $50, leaving a total of $500.

Penny poodle wanted to know which dog obedience training program was more effective: puppy pride, the approach she has been using for any years, or doggie do-right, a new approach. penny convinced 50 human companions of untrained dogs to participate in her study. the dogs and their humans were randomly assigned to complete the puppy pride or doggie do-right course. at the end of the training programs, all of the dogs were scored on their level of obedience on a standardized dog obedience checklist (scores could range from 10 to 100). the design of this study is:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?