The most recent financial statements for Bello Co. are shown here: Income Statement Balance Sheet Sales $ 20,400 Current assets $ 12,000 Debt $ 16,600 Costs 14,000 Fixed assets 32,850 Equity 28,250 Taxable income $ 6,400 Total $ 44,850 Total $ 44,850 Taxes (22%) 1,408 Net income $ 4,992 Assets and costs are proportional to sales. Debt and equity are not. The company maintains a constant 35 percent dividend payout ratio. What is the sustainable growth rate?

Record the journal entry for the provision for uncollectible accounts under each of the following independent assumptions: a. the allowance for doubtful accounts before adjustment has a credit balance of $500. b. the allowance for doubtful accounts before adjustment has a debit balance of $250. c. assume that octoberʼs credit sales were $70,000. uncollectible accounts expense is estimated at 2% of sales. smith, gaylord n.. excel applications for accounting principles (p. 51). cengage textbook. kindle edition.

The following accounts are from last year’s books at s manufacturing: raw materials bal 0 (b) 157,400 (a) 172,500 15,100 work in process bal 0 (f) 523,600 (b) 133,700 (c) 171,400 (e) 218,500 0 finished goods bal 0 (g) 477,000 (f) 523,600 46,600 manufacturing overhead (b) 23,700 (e) 218,500 (c) 27,700 (d) 159,400 7,700 cost of goods sold (g) 477,000 s manufacturing uses job-order costing and applies manufacturing overhead to jobs based on direct labor costs. what is the amount of cost of goods manufactured for the year

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?