Madison Corporation sells three products (M, N, and O) in the following mix: 3:1:2. Unit price and cost data are: M N OUnit sales price$12 $10 $11Unit variable costs 9 8 9Total fixed costs are $585,000. The selling price per composite unit for the current sales mix (rounded to the nearest cent) is:

You own a nonunion company with 93 nonexempt employees. all of these employ- ees pack books into boxes for shipment to customers throughout the united states. because of wide differences in performance, you have decided to try performance appraisal, something never done before. until now, you have given every worker the same size increase. now you want to measure performance and reward the best performers with bigger increases. without any further information, which of the five types of appraisal formats do you think would be most appropriate? justify your answer. do you anticipate any complaints, or other comments, from employees after you implement your new system?

Suppose that a paving company produces paved parking spaces (q) using a fixed quantity of land (t) and variable quantities of cement (c) and labor (l). the firm is currently paving 1,000 parking spaces. the firm's cost of cement is $3 comma 600.003,600.00 per acre covered (c) and its cost of labor is $35.0035.00/hour (w). for the quantities of c and l that the firm has chosen, mp subscript upper c baseline equals 60mpc=60 and mp subscript upper l baseline equals 7mpl=7. is this firm minimizing its cost of producing parking spaces?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?